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This paper investigates why regional trade arrangements (RTAs) are proliferating extensively and 
how the effects of multiple RTAs, by interacting with each other, evolve over time. Our empirical 
analysis, based on an extended gravity model utilizing a large panel data set of 175 countries 
from 1948 to 1999, shows that RTAs on average increase global trade by raising intra-bloc trade 
without damaging extra-bloc trade. The net trade effects, however, heavily depend on the types 
of RTA strategic evolution over time, which we group as “expansionary” RTAs, “duplicate” 
RTAs or “overlapping” RTAs. We find that countries excluded from an RTA can benefit more 
from duplicating a separate RTA than from joining an existing RTA. This result explains why the 
number of bilateral trade blocs, rather than the membership size of existing RTAs, is currently 
exploding. We also find that the net trade creation effects of RTAs are substantially lower for 
countries participating in overlapping RTAs. This result suggests that it is less likely that the 
currently proliferating RTAs will completely merge and lead the world economy to global free 
trade. Our empirical results are robust to controlling for the characteristics of countries that may 
influence the impact of RTAs. 
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Regional trade arrangements (RTAs) have been proliferating in recent years. As 
of December 2002, some 250 RTAs have been notified to GATT/WTO, of which 
130 were notified after January 1995.
１  Even after the launch of the WTO multilateral 
trading system, there seems to be a clear shift of preference away from multilateralism 
to regionalism. 
Will proliferation of RTAs be a “building block” or a “stumbling block”, in 
Bhagwati’s (1993) phrase, to global free trade? There are at least two important issues 
concerning this question.    The first issue is whether RTAs raise trade and welfare 
among the trade bloc members, without damaging the welfare of nonmembers, i.e. 
whether ‘trade creation’ occurs without associated ‘trade diversion’.    If RTAs incurred 
damaging effects on nonmembers, they would not necessarily lead to an increase in 
global trade and welfare.    The second issue concerns the effect of the proliferation of 
RTAs on global trade over time. If the net trade creation effects of RTAs are positive, 
excluded countries can be impelled to seek membership of existing RTAs or negotiate 
new RTAs, thereby influencing global trade over time. The long-term effects on global 
trade hinge critically on whether the impetus triggers expansion of existing RTAs or 
duplication of separate RTAs.    At the same time, the existence of many overlapping 
RTAs may encounter the problem of discriminatory trade blocs that could be harmful to 
global free trade.   
It is an on-going debate among economists and policy makers whether the 
proliferation of RTAs encourages or discourages global free trade. Although numerous 
                                                 
１ See WTO web site—http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm. 
  1studies have addressed this issue, there is still a lack of consensus.
２ Many  studies  have 
investigated whether regional trade blocs raise the economic welfare of the integrating 
partners and the excluded countries.    However, the existing empirical studies have 
mostly focused on assessing the static and aggregate effects of RTAs on intra- and extra-
bloc trade.    To date, no empirical paper has systematically assessed how the effects of 
multiple RTAs, by interacting with each other, evolve over time.    This paper attempts 
to fill this gap.    We analyze empirically the trade creation or diversion effects of 
various types of RTA proliferation such as expansion of existing RTAs, duplication of 
separate RTAs or establishment of overlapping RTAs.   
Our empirical analysis, based on a standard gravity model utilizing a large 
panel data set of 175 countries from 1948 to 1999, shows that countries excluded from 
an RTA can obtain more benefit from duplicating a separate RTA than from joining an 
existing RTA.    This result may explain why the number of bilateral trade blocs is 
currently exploding, whereas the membership size of existing RTAs tends to stall. We 
also find that the trade creation effects become to decline, eventually to zero, as more 
and more members join multiple RTAs.    The significant decline in the trade creation 
effect of overlapping RTAs suggests that proliferating RTAs may not lead to an increase 
in global trade. Our empirical results are robust to controlling for the characteristics of 
countries that may influence the impact of RTAs.   
The paper is organized in five sections.    In section II, we present an overview 
of the existing debate on the economic effects of RTAs.    Section III discusses empirical 
methodology and introduces the bilateral gravity model for evaluating the trade-creating 
and trade-diverting effects of RTAs.    Section IV presents and discusses the estimation 
                                                 
２  See the survey in section II. 
  2results.    Concluding remarks follow in Section V.   
 
II.  Economic Effects of Regional Trade Arrangements 
 
In this section, we briefly summarize the existing debate on the economic effects 
of RTAs on global trade.    The first question is whether the effects of RTAs on intra- and 
extra-bloc trade are positive.    The second question is whether proliferating RTAs can 
lead to global free trade over time.   
 
1. Trade Creation and Trade Diversion 
 
Since Viner (1950) introduced the trade creation and diversion effects of the 
Customs Union (CU) and Kemp and Wan (1976) further clarified the positive net trade 
creation effect possible for CUs, there have been numerous studies analyzing the welfare 
effects of RTAs from both theoretical and empirical bases.
３  However, it remains an open 
question whether RTAs create more trade than they divert.   
Krugman (1993) presents a model in which regional integration creates trade 
diversion because members raise the external tariff.    However, as long as external trade 
barriers are not very high, trade diversion can be smaller.    Clearly trade diversion can 
occur with discriminatory, but not most favored nation (MFN), tariff reductions.   
  Aside from the immediate impact of RTAs on trade, there is an evolution of trade 
creation and diversion effects.    For instance, an RTA influences long-run growth of 
                                                 
３ See the discussions in Baldwin and Venables (1995), Winters (1996) and Bhagwati, Greenaway and 
Panagariya (1998). 
  3member countries and then may have spillover effects on outsiders.    Some empirical 
studies, by estimating the static effects of RTAs, suggest that RTAs expand intra-bloc 
trade but contract trade with nonmember countries.    However, as an increased trade 
between member countries expands market size, creates more investment, and results in 
income growth over time, RTAs can provide nonmember countries with increased 
opportunities to exploit the larger market, thereby reducing the problem of trade diversion.   
This growth effect turns RTAs into “building blocs” toward global free trade as 
emphasized in Baldwin (1995) and Laird (1999).  Lawrence (1996) indicates that the 
growth effects of RTAs offset the initial trade diversion effect because import demand 
from nonmembers can be stimulated by growth or economies of scale over time.   
Wonnacott and Lutz (1989) and Wonnacott (1996) also highlight the importance of 
economies of scale that increase the efficiency of inefficient members by lowering their 
cost of production enough to reduce the likelihood of trade diversion.  In  addition, 
Wonnacott (1996) argues that trade diversion may force import-competing industries in a 
member country to reduce their trade barriers against nonmembers because of increased 
competition from RTAs.   
On the other hand, a number of studies address the issues of RTA membership to 
examine if some characteristics of the members are important in raising the net gains from 
an RTA. Wonnacott and Lutz (1989), Summers (1991), Krugman (1993), and Frankel et 
al. (1995) introduce the concept of “natural trading partner” by arguing that some 
characteristics of RTA members can maximize the positive welfare gains from RTAs. 
They find that with larger pre-RTA trade volumes and lower transportation costs between 
members, RTAs are more likely to be welfare-improving.    It is natural to form an RTA 
between geographically close neighbors for which transportation costs are comparably 
  4cheap.    Trade diversion occurs when discriminatory tariff liberalization leads member 
countries to import from the suppliers who are not the lowest-cost suppliers.    Thus, trade 
diversion is likely to be small if the RTA partners are initially low-cost producers.   
  Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996), Krueger (1999), and Panagariya (1999) argue 
that neighbors are not necessarily natural trading partners.    They emphasize the 
importance of pre-RTA bilateral trade volume instead of geographical proximity between 
trading partners.    For NAFTA, they argue that the United States is Mexico’s natural 
trading partner but the reverse is not true.    The United States is a natural trading partner 
of both Canada and Mexico, but Canada and Mexico are not natural trading partners of 
each other (Panagariya, 1999).    Lawrence (1996) concludes that there is no clear 
evidence that supposedly ‘natural’ trading partners based on geographical proximity are 
better to produce a net trade creation effect from RTAs. 
In addition, Krueger (1999) and Lawrence (1996) argue that natural trading 
partners may not create a net trade creation effect when neighbors have similar 
endowments.    Grimwade (1996) also emphasizes the importance of complementary 
economic structure between potential RTA members to guarantee the net trade creation 
effect.  
 
2. Proliferation of RTAs and Global Trade     
 
The longer-term impacts of RTAs also depend on the interactions of countries 
that do not belong to the same regional blocs.    Depending on this force, RTAs can 
  5follow either an ‘expansionary path’ or a ‘stagnant path’ to global free trade.
４ 
Baldwin (1995) introduces the “domino effect” to explain the proliferation of 
regional trade blocs.    Regional trading blocs produce gains from freer trade for 
members.    Thus, exporters in nonmember countries will push their governments to 
seek membership of existing RTAs or negotiate new RTAs in order to counteract the 
potential damage caused by the preferential  trade  liberalization.  This  enlargement 
triggers the domino effect, which can increase either the number of regional blocs or the 
membership size of existing RTAs.    Bergsten (2001) also observes that the 
demonstration effect of significant payoffs coming from RTAs makes broader 
membership possible.    Bergsten (2001) and Lamy (2002) also argue that RTAs 
promote "best practice," and thus improve multilateral outcomes.    Furthermore, 
Summers (1991) and Laird (1999) argue that the smaller number of participants and 
more simplified management process under regional arrangements tend to reduce 
negotiation costs and therefore increase efficiency gains. 
On the other hand, some skeptics of regionalism emphasize the significant trade 
diversion effect of RTAs caused by the discriminatory nature of trade barriers between 
members and nonmembers.    They consider RTAs primarily as a protectionist strategy 
to impede further multilateral liberalization.    In this regard, Winters (1996) asserts that 
RTAs can be a false insurance distracting a country's movement toward bigger free trade 
blocs.    Freund (2000) also emphasizes first-mover advantages, which may act against 
expansion of the existing RTAs.    If sunk costs such as distribution network costs of 
trade are incurred at the entrance, incumbent members pay lower marginal costs than 
new entrants because the former pay only the production cost.    While the first-mover 
                                                 
４  See Bhagwati (1993) and Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996). 
  6advantages initially provide incentives to join the membership as quickly as possible, 
eventually nonmembers will have lower incentives to follow. 
Bhagwati et al. (1998) and Panagariya (1999) introduce the concept of the 
"spaghetti bowl phenomenon" to explain the harmful effect caused by the multiple and 
complicated rules of origin in RTAs, particularly from overlapping RTAs among 
members of different RTAs.    The rules of origin are often used as a direct or indirect 
instrument of protection (Falvey and Reed, 2002). Several recent papers including 
Cadot et al. (2002) and Augier et al. (2004) provide evidence that restrictive rules of 
origin do indeed curtail the trade creation from RTAs.    In addition, severe non-tariff 
barriers and very high tariff barriers remaining in specific industries such as agriculture 
are other sources of trade diversion.  Panagariya  (1999)  also suggests that members of 
existing RTAs have an incentive to block new entrants if the size of the RTA reaches a 
certain level.    These entry barriers render the "domino effect" less likely and more 
ineffective.    However, it is still a debatable question whether overlapping RTAs have 
mitigating effects on global trade or not.    RTAs can internalize negative externalities 
such as the "spaghetti bowl phenomenon" by limiting the number of players and 
providing more opportunities for learning processes than multilateral trade negotiations 
can. 
 
III.  Empirical Methodology and Data   
 
1. Review of Empirical Methodology 
 
Empirical analysis on the effects of RTAs is mainly based on two distinct 
  7methodologies.    One relies on a simulation approach based on global general 
equilibrium models to analyze the economic effects of policy changes due to the 
formation of RTAs.    The second method applies econometric approaches to historical 
trade data and assesses the impacts of the formation of RTAs on bilateral trade flows.
５   
The simulation approach uses a static computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model or a dynamic intertemporal general equilibrium model.    The simulation approach 
is useful in specifying the mechanism by which the formation of RTAs translates into 
improvements of the economy.    Robinson and Thierfelder (1999) survey the empirical 
literature on multi-country CGE models that analyze the economic effects of RTAs.   
According to their survey, simulations based on the general equilibrium models usually 
find substantial ex ante gains from trade liberalization between RTA members.   
However, Panagariya and Dutta-Gupta (2001) criticize that the ‘few robust conclusions’ 
in Robinson and Thierfelder (1999) are drawn by internally inconsistent assumptions and 
questionable values of key parameters.    By carefully considering the caveats about CGE 
models, Lloyd and MacLaren (2003) suggest that RTAs have positive welfare and net 
trade creating effects on members, while the effects on nonmembers are negative and tend 
to increase with RTA size.    Scollay and Gilbert (2001) and McKibbin, Lee and Cheong 
(2004) also show that RTAs involving a sub-bloc of East Asian countries could have a 
negative impact on excluded countries. 
The second approach uses a gravity model of bilateral trade flows.    The model 
is based on the idea that trade between two countries, like the gravitational force 
between two masses, is a function of the countries’ size as well as the distance between 
                                                 
５  Burfisher, Robinson and Thierfelder (2004) review the empirical findings on trade effects of RTAs 
focusing on the two methodologies adopted.    They indicate that the empirical evidence found from the 
global general equilibrium analysis is relatively more supportive for the net trade creation and positive 
  8them.
６  Thus, the model estimates “normal” trade flows, and then assesses whether the 
formation of an RTA will change the trade flows.   
A number of variants of the gravity model have been used in previous studies to 
assess the effects of RTAs.    Aitken (1973), Frankel (1993), and Braga et al. (1994) 
introduce a variable that takes the value of one if the two trading countries are both 
members of the same RTA and zero otherwise.    A positive coefficient of the RTA 
variable indicates that RTAs tend to generate more trade to their members.    Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen (1997), Frankel (1997), and Frankel and Wei (1998) add another 
dummy variable, representing extra-bloc trade, which takes the value of one for the 
bilateral trade between an RTA member and a nonmember country.    Hence, the 
coefficient of this “extra-bloc trade” indicates the degree of the RTA’s trade-diverting 
effects.    Most studies find that RTAs tend to increase trade between members and the 
rest of the world, and thereby foster greater trade worldwide.    However, some RTAs 
are estimated to have negative effects on extra-bloc trade.    Frankel and Wei (1998), for 
example, show that the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) has a significant 
trade-diversion effect.    Dee and Gali (2003) present evidence that a number of recent 
RTAs have diverted more trade from nonmembers than they have created among 
members. 
 
2. Empirical Specification and Data 
  
                                                                                                                                               
welfare effects of RTAs on member economies compared to the studies utilizing econometric analysis. 
６  See Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985), and Evenett and Keller (2002) for the theoretical background 
of the gravity equation. 
  9This research adopts the gravity model analysis to evaluate the trade effects of RTAs.   
We set up a conventional gravity model of international trade with a number of extra 
variables.
７    The extended gravity model of international trade takes the following form: 
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ijt ij j i ij
t j i j i t j i ijt
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where i and j denote countries, t denotes time, Tradeijt denotes the average value of the 
real bilateral trade between i and j at time t, GDP is real GDP, Pop is Population, Dist is 
the distance between i and j, Area is the land mass of the country, Border is a binary 
variable which is unity if i and j share a land border, Language is a binary variable 
which is unity if i and j have a common language, ExComColony is a binary variable 
which is unity if i and j were ever colonies after 1945 under the same colonizer, 
ExColony is a binary variable which is unity if i ever colonized j or vice versa, 
CurColony is a binary variable which is unity if i and j are colonies at time t, CuUnion 
is a binary variable which is unity if i and j join a currency union at time t, and Year 
denotes a set of binary variables which are unity in the specific year t.   
RTA/Insiders is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong to the same 
RTA, and RTA/Outsiders is a binary variable which is unity if i belongs to an RTA and j 
does not, or vice versa.    Thus, the dummy RTA/Insiders measures the degree of trade-
creation effects of the RTA between members, while the dummy RTA/Outsiders captures 
the degree of trade-diverting effects between members and nonmembers, compared to 
                                                 
７  We extend Rose (2004) for the empirical specification. 
  10the “normal” bilateral trade flows.   
The data come from Rose (2004), which covers 175 countries from 1948 to 
1999.    The original Rose data set has a measure for RTAs, but this consists of only 
eleven RTAs.    We expand this data set by adding more observations comprising 19 
multilateral RTAs and 49 bilateral RTAs over the sample period, based on data from the 
WTO.    The multilateral RTAs include the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), Baltic 
Free Trade Area (BAFTA), Central American Common Market (CACM), Andean 
Community (CAN), Central America Common Market (CACM), Caribbean 
Community and Common Market (CARICOM), Central European FTA (CEFTA), 
Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement between Australia and New Zealand 
(CER), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Eurasian Economic Community 
(EAEC), European Communities/European Union (EC/EU), European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR), Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), Papua New Guinea - Australia Trade and Commercial Relations 
Agreement (PATCRA), SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA), South 
Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA).    The 
bilateral RTAs include US-Israel FTA and others.    We also count the accession of new 
parties to an agreement that already exists (for example, Portugal and Spain’s entry into 
the EC in 1986) as well as a new agreement between the existing RTA and new parties 
(for example, EC-Switzerland FTA since 1972).    We construct two RTA dummy 
variables: one for all intra-bloc country pairs (“insiders”) and the other for all member-
nonmember country pairs (“outsiders”).   
  11The data set has a feature of panel structure consisting of 234,597 annual 
observations clustered by 12,150 country pair groups from 1948 to 1999.    The number 
of observations varies per year.    Summary statistics for the whole data used in the 
estimation are presented in column (1) in Table 1.    Of all observations, 8,469 country-
pairs (about 3.6 %) belong to RTAs (“insiders”) and 116,166 country pairs (about 
49.5 %) belong to the member-nonmember (“outsiders”)  relationship.  Summary 
statistics for each case are reported in columns (2) and (3), respectively.    In Table 1, 
we observe at least three notable findings.    First, the logarithmic mean of trade in 
column (2) is much higher than that in column (1), indicating that the bilateral trade 
between RTA members is much higher than the average bilateral trade in the whole 
sample.    On the other hand, the logarithmic mean of trade in column (3) is comparable 
to that in column (1), indicating that the bilateral trade between members and 
nonmembers is not smaller than the average volume of bilateral trade in the whole 
sample.    From these figures, we may expect that RTAs create more trade among 
members without diverting trade from nonmembers.    However, this is a very casual 
observation because other important variables such as year and the size of countries are 
not  controlled.   
Second, RTAs have been formed among relatively smaller countries, in terms of 
both economic and geographical size.    The logarithmic mean of GDP in the pairs in 
column (2) is slightly smaller than that in column (1).    Taking into considerations that 
the mean year in column (2) is much higher, this implies that RTAs tend to be formed 
among economically smaller countries.    This is also confirmed by the fact that the 
logarithmic mean of GDP in the pairs in column (3) is much higher.    In addition, the 
logarithmic mean of area in the pairs in column (2) is smaller than that in column (1), 
  12indicating that RTAs tend to be formed among geographically smaller countries as well.   
Considering that small countries tend to more open, more active RTA membership 
among small countries is quite reasonable.    Interestingly, however, the logarithmic 
mean of per capita GDP in the pairs in column (2) is much higher than that in either 
column (1) or (3), suggesting that RTAs have been formed among relatively richer 
countries.  
Third, RTA membership seems to be chosen after taking account of some 
specific, possibly exogenous, country characteristics.  Aside  from  the  geographical 
size noted before, the logarithmic mean of distance is shorter in column (2) than that in 
column  (1).  Further,  RTA/Insider  countries in column (2) are more likely to share a 
common land border, common language and common colonizer.    These all suggest 
that there should be some preferable country characteristics that naturally lead to 
regional integration among themselves.    Countries that may be close to being “natural 
trading partners” may tend to form an RTA together.       
  While the above interpretations are suggestive, they are subject to serious 
limitations in that when each variable is discussed the other variables are not 
appropriately  controlled.  A  more  systematic  approach will follow in the next section.   
In particular, we will investigate quantitatively, (i) how much trade creation and 
diversion have occurred in general, (ii) whether the membership issues have been 
related to the net trade creation effects, that is, whether there is any evidence of natural 
trading partners, and (iii) how the recent proliferation of RTAs creates trade creation and 
diversion over time.    By doing so, we evaluate whether the proliferating RTAs will 
lead the world economy to global free trade.   
 
  13IV. Estimation of the Effects of RTAs on Trade 
 
1. Overall Trade Creation and Diversion Effects 
 
Table 2 presents the estimation results of specification (1) to investigate the 
impact of RTAs on intra- and extra-bloc memberships.    We apply two different 
estimation techniques: random effects and fixed effects.    Column (1) of Table 2 
presents the random effect estimates.    The gravity model fits the data well, explaining 
a major part of the variation in bilateral trade flows.    The conventional variables 
behave very much the same way as the model predicts, and the estimated coefficients 
are statistically significant.    To summarize briefly, the estimated coefficients for the 
bilateral distance and log of area in pair are significantly negative.    The estimated 
coefficient for the log of bilateral distance (-1.219, s.e.=0.025) in column (1) by the 
random effects estimation implies that a decline in the log of bilateral distance by 0.809 
(its standard deviation) leads to an increase of the bilateral trade by 169.1 %. The 
estimated coefficients for the log of GDP in pair, log of per capita GDP in pair, common 
land border dummy, common language dummy, ex-common colonizer dummy, ex-
colony-colonizer dummy, and current colony dummy are significantly positive.    Thus, 
larger GDP and per capita GDP lead countries to trade more.    In our estimates in 
column (1), a 10% increase in GDP increases trade by 8.7%. A 10% increase in per 
capita GDP raises trade by 0.2%.    A common land border or common language 
connection increases trade by about 96.4% or 46.5%, respectively.
８   
Our primary interest is in the impact of RTAs on intra- and extra-bloc trade. In 
                                                 
８  For example, since e
0.675=1.964, an increase from 0 (no common border) to 1 (common border) in the 
  14column (1) of Table 2, the estimated coefficient on the RTA membership dummy 
variable is positive and statistically significant.    The estimate on the intra-bloc 
membership (0.515, s.e.=0.023) implies that a pair of countries that join an RTA 
experiences an increase in bilateral trade of 67.4%, with other variables held constant.
９  
The estimate on the extra-bloc dummy variable (0.085, s.e.=0.010) is also positive and 
statistically significant.    The estimate implies that the RTA members’ trade with the 
nonmembers is estimated to rise by 8.9% on average.    Hence, RTAs do not divert trade 
from other countries that do not belong to the bloc.   
Column (2) of Table 2 presents the fixed effect “within” estimates.    This 
method can provide more consistent estimates by controlling for the influences from 
omitted country-specific factors.    For example, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) 
show that the typical gravity model does not incorporate the ‘relative distance effect’, 
i.e., the likelihood that a country pair that is located more distantly from the world 
market will trade more than otherwise.    The fixed-effect estimation can provide 
consistent-estimates by controlling for the unobserved (time-invariant) relative distance 
term.    In addition, this estimate from time-series variation is useful in answering the 
question of “what would happen to a country’s intra- and extra-bloc trade after joining 
an RTA?”.    One drawback of this fixed-effect approach is that since the fixed effect 
                                                                                                                                               
common border dummy variable raises bilateral trade by 96.4%. 
９ Note that we treat RTAs as exogenous. However, countries may have joined RTAs when they expect to 
increase trade. Then, the large effect of RTAs may reflect reverse causality. This endogeneity issue can in 
principle be handled with instruments. The problem, however, is that good instrumental variables have 
not been available to evaluate the effects from RTAs. A recent study by Baier and Bergstrand (2003) 
attempts to use three sets of instrumental variables: (i) remoteness of RTA partners from the rest of the 
world, (ii) relative-factor-endowment differences between RTA partners, and (iii) relative-factor-
endowment differences between an RTA country pair and the rest of the world. They have also used 
“political-economy” variables such as differences in labor shares of two countries in agriculture, and an 
income inequality measure. The results show much larger effects of RTAs on trade flows than the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) results. Hence, the positive effects of RTAs on trade in OLS estimation do 
not seem to reflect the reverse causality that runs from trade to the choice of joining an RTA.     
  15estimator exploits variation over time, we cannot obtain the estimates for time-invariant 
factors such as distance, area, land border, and ex-colonial relationship.
１０ 
The fixed-effect estimate on the intra-bloc trade (0.416, s.e.=0.024) shows that 
joining an RTA raises intra-bloc trade by 51.6%, which is slightly smaller than the 
random effect estimate.    The estimated coefficient on extra-bloc trade (0.063, 
s.e.=0.010) is also slightly smaller than that for the random effects, but is statistically 
very  significant.  Overall,  however, the fixed effects estimate is very consistent with 
the random effects estimate.    Both estimates show that after a country joins an RTA its 
intra-bloc trade increases considerably, without having any harmful impact on its extra-
bloc trade. This seems to indicate RTAs can lead to an increase in global trade. 
Nevertheless, the following sections will further scrutinize this issue.       
 
2. Effects of RTAs on Natural Trading Partners 
 
As emphasized by Wonnacott and Lutz (1989), Summers (1991), Krugman 
(1993) and Frankel et al. (1995), RTAs are more likely to be welfare improving if 
natural trading partners are members of RTAs.    In order to investigate this possibility, 
we test if the trade creation from RTAs occurs more heavily from a subset of countries 
that could be considered as natural trading partners.    There are at least two dimensions 
of trade creation we need to consider in association with natural trading  partners.  First, 
                                                                                                                                               
 
10 Another estimation technique, the “between-effects” model, uses only cross-country variation (in 
essence, using data averaged by country-pair). Hence, this estimate explains how much an RTA affects a 
country’s intra- and extra-bloc trade compared to others which do not join the RTA. Since this method 
relies on less variation, particularly for a regional bloc with a small number of members, it makes the 
estimate of intra-bloc dummy variable very imprecise by increasing its standard error. 
 
  16how much more trade creation takes place between natural trading partners if they 
become members of the same RTA?    Second, if a natural trading partner is excluded 
from the RTA membership, does the excluded country still benefit from the other natural 
trading partners that form RTAs with other countries?     
In practice, it is hard to classify countries as natural trading partners or not.   
One element characterizing natural trading partners that is worthy of special attention is 
low transaction costs involved with trade.    Based on this idea we adopt two criteria to 
select natural trading partners: geographical distance and language.    That is, we 
assume that transaction costs will be lower if two countries are located geographically 
close or if two countries use a common language.    According to our classification, 
natural trading partners are defined as closely located countries or those using a 
common language.   
More specifically we have defined natural trading partners in the following three 
ways.    First, we use a common land border as an indication of geographical closeness.   
Then we examine the possibility of more trade creation (or diversion) of RTAs 
comprising (or excluding) bordering countries.    We implement this idea by 
introducing interaction terms between the intra- and extra-bloc RTA dummies and the 
common border dummy:  / RTAs InBorder  and  / RTAs OutBorder .  For  example, 
/ RTAs InBorder   indicates that the members of an RTA share a common land border 
as well.    Second, we can extend the idea to see if geometric distance matters in a 
continuous fashion.    Namely we introduce interaction terms between the intra- and 
extra-bloc RTA dummies and distance,  / RTA InDist /  and RTA OutDist , to express 
an alternative measure of geographical closeness.    Finally we examine the second 
possibility of classifying natural trading partners based on the usage of a common 
  17language by analogously defining two new interaction terms for a common language, 
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In this setting of the estimation, for example, total additional trade creation by forming 
an RTA between bordering members compared to a random match is estimated by 
summing up the coefficients of the two dummy variables,  / RTA Insiders  and 
RTAs , where the coefficient of  / RTA Insiders   represents the trade creation 
of an RTA for members in general (for trade between non-bordering members) and that 
of  R   represents the additional trade creation of an RTA for bordering 
members.    On the other hand, additional trade diversion from a bordering country that 
is excluded from an RTA compared to a random match is estimated by summing up the 
coefficients of two dummy variables,  /Outsiders and  / RTA OutBorder , where 
the coefficient of  / TA O   represents the trade diversion from an excluded 
country in general (for trade between members and non-bordering nonmembers) and 
/ RTA   represents the additional trade diversion of an RTA from a bordering 
country that is excluded from the membership.   
The estimation results with the newly-defined dummy variables are reported in 
Table 3.    Since the estimation results with random effects are very similar, and in order 
to save space, we report the estimation results with fixed effects only.    In columns (1), 
(2) and (3), a pair of interaction terms for each case is added separately.    Then we 
  18include all the three pairs of interaction terms together in column (4).     
In every column, the first four estimated coefficients for the time-varying control 
variables are remarkably similar to those estimated for equation (1).    For example, the 
estimated coefficient for the log of GDP in pair in columns (1)~(4) is 0.394~0.404, 
which is very close to 0.404, the estimate in column (2) in Table 2.    This indicates that 
the newly added dummy variables do not complicate the other essential parts of the 
gravity equation.   
In column (1), unlike the coefficients of the time varying control variables, the 
estimated coefficient of  / RTA Insiders   (0.333, s.e.=.0.025) is significantly reduced.   
In contrast, the estimated coefficient of  / RTA InBorder
/
  (0.662, s.e.=0.070) is highly 
significant, positive and large.    If we just take the figures in column (1), they suggest 
that trade between bordering RTA members is four times as large as between non-
bordering members.    The coefficient of  RTA Outsider
/
s  (0.058, s.e.=0.010) is also 
slightly reduced, whereas the coefficient of  RTA OutBorder   (0.281, s.e.=0.060) is 
positive, large and highly significant.    This suggests that even if a bordering country is 
excluded from RTA membership, trade is actually created between the RTA member and 
the bordering nonmember and that the degree of the trade creation is much larger than 
that between the RTA member and the non-bordering nonmember. 
The estimated results in column (2) also confirm that the impact of RTA varies 
depending on the distance between member countries.    The estimated coefficient of 
/ RTA InDist
/
, which is negative and highly significant, implies that an increase in the 
log of bilateral distance by 0.809 (its standard deviation) leads to a 26.5% decline in the 
bilateral trade creation for the intra-membership. The estimated coefficient of 
RTA OutDist   is also negative and significant, suggesting that the closer two countries 
  19are, the greater is the trade diversion from the extra-bloc membership.   
In column (3), we also find that a common language plays a role in determining 
the impact of RTAs on trade.    The estimated coefficient for  / RTA Insiders
/
 is  again 
significantly lower than the estimate in Table 2 and the coefficient of  RTA InLang is 
positive, large and highly significant.    The estimate is, however, smaller than the 
estimate for the trade creation made by bordering  members.  An  interesting 
observation is that while the estimated coefficient of  / RTA Outsiders
/
  is a little bit 
higher than the estimates in Table 2, the estimated coefficient of  RTA OutLang is 
negative and highly significant.    Furthermore, the sum of the coefficients of 
/ RTA Outsiders and  / RTA OutLang   is even negative.    This implies that despite the 
general trade creation from extra-bloc membership countries, trade diversion actually 
takes place from nonmember countries that use a common language.     
Overall, our results consistently show that the impact of RTAs can be greater for 
a subset of countries that satisfy some desirable characteristics.    In column (4), when 
we put the three pairs of dummies together, we also reach the same conclusion.    While 
the estimates of the three interaction terms for the intra-membership and the three 
interaction terms for the extra-bloc membership are both lowered in absolute value, they 
are all significant and of the same sign as before.
１１ 
  So far we have considered the possibility of different impacts of RTAs 
based on the idea of natural trading partners that heavily relies on low transaction costs 
for trade. However, it is believed that there are potentially other dimensions of country 
characteristics that may act as determinants of the impact of RTAs on trade.    For 
example, the fact that the two countries had a common colonizer may have affected the 
                                                 
11 The only exception is the coefficient of RTAs/OutLang that is slightly higher in absolute value than 
  20quality of institutions, which in turn influences how effectively RTAs are 
maintained.
１２  The trading partners’ GDP, per capita GDP and country size factors can 
be considered as critical determinants of pre-RTA trade volume, which characterize 
“natural trading partners”.    Instead of conducting a more detailed investigation, we 
simply report the estimation results in column (5) of Table 3, when we include all the 
interaction terms of the control variables and the intra- and extra-membership 
dummies.
１３   In the next section, these results will be used to see if these other 
characteristics also have important implications for the dynamics of RTAs.    Before we 
move on, however, we note two important findings from the regression results.    First, 
while the estimates change, the coefficients of the six interaction terms of the intra- and 
extra-memberships used to test natural trading partners are still significant and hold the 
same sign as before.    This implies that despite the possibility of other characteristics 
influencing the impact of RTAs, the argument of natural trading partners based on low 
transaction costs remains valid.    Second, the interaction terms of other control 
variables and the intra- and extra-membership dummies are also highly significant, 
suggesting that there are other characteristics of countries that may influence the impact 
of RTAs.    Unlike border, distance and common language, the criteria we used for 
natural trading partners, however, some of the other control variables such as real GDP 
are endogenous and hence lead to difficulties in interpreting the results.       
 
3. Trade Effects of the Proliferation of RTAs— Expansionary, Duplicate, or 
                                                                                                                                               
before. 
12 There is a recent, but rapidly growing, body of literature that emphasizes different types of institutions 
inherited from different colonizers.    See, for example, Acemoglu et al. (2002). 
13 Among the dummies associated with colony, we include only the ex-common colonizer dummy.    The 
other colony dummies, when included, are not significant.       
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An important question regarding RTAs is whether or not their proliferation 
gives impetus to the worldwide nondiscriminatory free trade.
１４  As reviewed in section 
II, however, the various models invented to answer this question reach conflicting 
conclusions.    Thus, we believe the answer to this question lies in an empirical 
investigation.    In this section, by analyzing empirically the incentive of members and 
nonmembers to expand the membership of existing RTAs, duplicate separate RTAs or 
establish overlapping RTAs, we seek an answer to this question.    Especially the 
incentive is assessed by evaluating how trade creation or diversion occurs as various 
types of RTAs are formulated.     
 
A. Expansion or Duplication of RTAs 
In order to determine if an RTA eventually leads to an expansionary path, a 
globally free market or coexisting multiple RTAs, one important consideration is the 
following incentive for nonmembers: are they more inclined to join an existing RTA or 
duplicate a separate RTA with other extra-bloc members?    By investigating how trade 
creation or diversion takes place in each case, we seek an answer to this question.   
First, we assess whether trade creation from the newly expanded membership is 
significantly different from that from the original membership.  Suppose  that  countries 
A and B establish an RTA first and later expand the membership to county C.    Is the 
degree of trade creation made from the expanded membership between C and A (or B) 
lower than that from the original membership between countries A and B?    If this is the 
                                                 
14 This is “the dynamic time path question” coined by Bhagwati (1993). 
  22case, then it is less advantageous for the existing RTA to expand its scope to encompass 
nonmembers, thereby advancing toward globally freer trade.     
While the above question is essentially a dynamic one, we implement it in a 
simple way.    For the RTA that expands its membership over time, we introduce two 
new dummy variables to distinguish original and new members, i.e.,  / RTAs Original 
and / RTAs Expansion, that are defined as follows
１５: 
   / ijt RTAs Original   is a binary variable which is unity if i and j are the original 
members of an RTA that expands its membership. 
   / ijt RTAs Expansion   is a binary variable which is unity if i or j newly join an 
existing RTA that includes the other as an original member. 
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In this setting of the estimation,  / RTAs Insiders captures  the  trade creation made for 
members of all RTAs.    On the other hand,  / RTAs Original
/
 captures  the  additional 
trade creation taking place for the members that originally established the RTA that 
expands its membership later.    Furthermore,  RTAs Expansion captures  the 
additional trade creation taking place between the original member and the newly joined 
member or between the newly joined members of the expanded RTA.    
                                                 
15 These dummy variables are defined only when the RTA expands its membership.    For the case where 
there is no new entrant, the membership of the RTA is still the same as before, i.e., RTA/Insiders. 
  23The estimation results for equation (3) with both random and fixed effects are 
reported in Table 4.    Since the estimation results with random effects in column (1) are 
very similar, and to be consistent with previous interpretations in Table 3, we focus on 
those with fixed effects.    In column (2), the estimation results with fixed-effects show 
that the estimated coefficient for  / RTA Insiders   (0.899, s.e.=0.054) is significantly 
higher than the estimate in Table 2.    The estimated coefficient for  / RTAs Original
/
 is 
negative, but statistically insignificant, indicating that the trade creation for original 
members is not significantly different from that for the intra-membership for the RTA 
that never expands.    However, the estimated coefficient of  RTAs Expansion (-0.635, 
s.e.=0.060) is negative, large in absolute value, and highly significant.    This implies 
that the trade creation for new members is much lower than that for the original 
members.    According to the estimate, the trade creation made for new members is 
30.2%, which is much lower than the 145.7% estimate for the members of the RTA that 
never expands or the 133.3 % estimate for the original members.     
Table 4 can be interpreted as showing evidence that new members are 
disadvantaged or discriminated against by the original members.    Freund (2000) 
introduces a theoretical model in which, by strategically committing high bilateral 
exports at the entrance, the original members can trade permanently more than the new 
members.    He also adds empirical evidence to support the model based on the trade 
data for the European Union.
１６  However, there is one caveat in interpreting our results 
in this way. If the decision to form the RTA is endogenously made, it is more likely that 
the RTA will be initially established among countries that maximize the benefit, which 
                                                 
16 The European Union expanded from six members in 1958, to nine in 1973, and reached twelve by 1986. 
Freund focused solely on the European Union because, until recently, it was the only RTA to expand its 
membership significantly.    However, in our data set, besides the European Union, we include other 
  24in our case is trade creation between pairs of original member countries.    As the RTA 
expands its membership over time, countries that are less desirable for trade creation 
will be added, generating less trade creation from new members.    By taking the RTA 
decision exogenously, we do not explicitly consider this possibility.
１７ Freund  also 
notes this possibility and shows that even after controlling for preunion trade flows, as a 
result of comparative advantage, tastes and technology, the original members still trade 
more with each other. 
By using the results of the natural trading partners in the previous section, we 
can also investigate if country characteristics, such as those of natural trading partners, 
account for the trade creation gap between original and new members, or if there are 
other factors that disadvantage new members.    Table 5 reports the mean values of 
country characteristics for various subgroups.    In column (1), we illustrate the mean 
values of country characteristics for the original members and the new members.   
Indeed we find that the original members are more likely share a common land border 
and a common language, and that the distance between a pair of countries among them 
is on average shorter.    To what extent do these different characteristics between 
original and new members explain the trade creation gap between them?    The fixed 
effect estimates for the interaction terms between the three characteristics of natural 
trading partners and the intra-bloc membership dummy in column (4) in Table 3 suggest 
that these different characteristics explain about 0.250 in the metric of log trade.
１８  
                                                                                                                                               
expansionary RTAs such as CARICOM, CEFTA, EFTA and MERCOSUR.   
17 It is an intriguing question why some countries join an RTA from the beginning, others participate in it 
later, and some never join , but a formal investigation for the determination of the timing of joining an 
RTA is beyond the scope of our paper.       
 
18 This figure is obtained by adding up the differences of the mean values of the three natural trading 
partners characteristics between the original and new member groups, in column 1 of Table 5, multiplying 
with the coefficients of the corresponding interaction terms between each characteristic and the intra-bloc 
  25Since the trade creation gap between the original members and the new members is 
estimated to be 0.583 in the metric of log trade in Table 4
１９, the fact that original 
members consist of more natural trading partners explains much less than 50 % of the 
trade creation gap.    When we extend the same exercise to capture all the other 
characteristics as well, namely by using the estimates in column (5) in Table 3, all other 
characteristics in the sum actually contribute to more trade creation for new members, 
thereby providing no additional explanation for the trade creation gap between original 
and  new  members.   
Overall our results suggest that new members are likely to be disadvantaged in 
creating trade by joining existing RTAs late.    This may reflect ‘first-mover advantage’, 
that is, the discriminatory nature of RTAs against late-comers.  Anyhow, the relatively 
lower benefit obtained by new members from joining an existing RTA can make it 
d i f f i c u l t   f o r   R T A s   t o   e x p a n d .             
An alternative option, instead of joining the existing RTA, is for nonmembers 
to duplicate separate RTAs among themselves.    For example, country C, instead of 
joining the existing RTA of countries A and B, establishes another RTA with country D. 
This must create trade between countries C and D as original members of a new RTA 
and will thus provide a strong incentive for a country excluded from an existing RTA 
to form a new RTA. However, forming a duplicate RTA may have an additional 
diversion effect on bilateral trade of country C with the existing RTA members (A and 
B).    Thus, an important question is whether and to what degree the duplication of 
RTAs diverts trade more from members of the existing RTA (that is, trade diversion of 
                                                                                                                                               
membership dummy, in column (4) in Table 3. 
19 This figure is calculated by subtracting the estimate of RTAs/Expansion from the estimate of 
RTAs/Original in the fixed effect estimation. 
  26C from A or B) than from other nonmember countries that have never formed any RTA.   
Insofar as this diversion effect is not strong, it is more likely that duplication of RTAs, 
rather than expansion of the existing RTAs, proliferates.   
We implement this idea in a similar way by using another new dummy variable 
representing a nonmember country that duplicates a separate RTA with other countries, 
i.e., / RTAs Duplicate, that is defined as follows:   
  
   / ijt RTAs Duplicate   is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong to different   
RTAs . 
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The estimation results for equation (4) are reported in Table 6.    In column (2), the 
estimation results with fixed-effects show that the estimated coefficient for 
/ RTA Outsiders  (0.058, s.e.=0.010) is slightly lower than the estimate in Table 2, but 
that the estimated coefficient for  / RTAs Duplicate  (0.166, s.e.=0.013) is positive and 
highly significant.
２０ This indicates that trade is actually created more from the subset 
of the nonmembers that belong to some other RTA(s).    According to the estimates, the 
trade creation made by members and nonmembers that belong to a duplicate RTA(s) is 
                                                 
20 Since the random effects estimation in column two also generates similar results, we interpret our 
results based on the fixed effects estimation only. 
  2725.1% greater than the trade made by a random match and 18.1% greater than the trade 
made by members and nonmembers that do not belong to any other RTA.    This 
increase in trade amounts to about 43.1% of the estimated trade creation made between 
RTA members (58.2% trade creation: estimate =0.459, s.e.=0.024).     
One might suspect that the increased trade creation in the above case is also due 
to different characteristics of the countries that duplicate RTAs.    In column (2) in 
Table 5, we show different country characteristics depending on whether they 
duplicate RTAs or not.    The differences in the mean values of the natural or economic 
characteristics between the duplicating and non-duplicating pairs are not very large. 
Nevertheless, the countries pairs that duplicate RTAs tend to be located much farther 
from, and are less likely to share a common land border with, the existing RTA 
members.  Since  it  is  a  member-nonmember relationship, we have to use the 
estimates of the interaction terms of various characteristics and the extra-bloc 
membership.      Based both on estimates in column (4) that rely on natural trading 
partners and on those in column (5) of Table 3 that rely on other characteristics as well, 
we find that these different characteristics essentially contribute nothing to the 
increased trade creation from duplicating RTAs.   
Thus our estimation strongly supports that the increased trade creation takes 
place between members and nonmembers belonging to other RTAs, merely through the 
duplication of a separate RTA.    This evidence can be interpreted to advocate that 
duplication of RTAs is not a hindrance to globally increased  trade.  At  the  same  time, 
however, this evidence, in conjunction with the previous one about the low trade 
creation for the expansionary RTA, shows that it is difficult for an RTA to expand to a 
globally freer trade. In other words, rather than being discriminated against as new 
  28members, nonmembers may be more inclined to duplicate another RTA that creates 
trade from members of the existing RTA as well as from members from the new RTA.   
Especially this is the case when there are relatively few countries belonging to the 
existing RTA and there are many nonmember countries potentially available for 
duplicating RTAs.    In other words, the benefit of high trade creation from duplicating 
RTAs that encompass many member countries will be more likely to dominate the low 
trade creation that is obtained by joining the existing RTA of only a few countries.
２１ 
Hence, the number of RTAs tends to increase by duplicating existing ones, and (the 
membership size of each existing RTA may not increase. RTAs will proliferate, but there 
is no tendency leading to a global free trade bloc.    This finding may explain the 
recently proliferation of bilateral RTA negotiations between extra-bloc members, for 
instance in East Asia. 
 
B. Overlapping RTAs: a Spaghetti Bowl Phenomenon?     
In the previous subsection, we showed that RTAs are more likely to proliferate. 
Then, what will happen to trade if more and more members join multiple RTAs? This 
subsection investigates the trade creation effects between a member that joins multiple 
RTAs and another member that does not, or between members that join multiple RTAs 
together. Considering the recent proliferation of overlapping RTAs, the trade effect of 
overlapping RTAs is of interest for its own sake.    In addition, this investigation will 
                                                 
21 Let’s consider the trade creation for a nonmember who can either join an existing RTA or alternatively 
duplicate a new RTA. In the metric of log trade based on fixed effects estimation, the additional trade 
creation is 0.364 if the nonmember joins the existing RTA. If the nonmember duplicates a separate RTA, 
its trade creation with the existing RTA members is 0.224.    Hence the trade creation with existing RTA 
members is higher if the nonmember joins the existing RTA.    However, the nonmember who joins the 
existing RTA loses a chance to create more trade with potential members of a duplicating RTA, though it 
gets additional trade creation (negative diversion) from the extra-bloc membership. Hence, if the existing 
RTA is not large enough, it is better for the nonmember to duplicate RTAs. 
  29provide an answer to the question of whether there is any incentive for multiple RTAs 
to eventually merge, thereby leading to a globally free market.
２２   The  proliferation 
of RTAs will lead eventually some countries to belong to multiple RTAs in which their 
membership can be exclusive or overlapped.    If the trade creation from overlapping 
RTAs is larger than that from exclusive ones, it may work as an incentive for the 
enlargement and eventual merging of RTAs.   
We first consider the trade creation for a single country that belongs to 
overlapping RTAs.    For example, while countries A and B are members of an RTA, 
country B alone forms another RTA with country C.    We investigate whether the new 
RTA affects the trade of country B— a single country belonging to multiple RTAs— 
with the other original RTA member country A.
２３  In this way we can assess whether 
the new RTA(s) conflicts with the existing RTA, thereby reducing the trade creation 
(between countries A and B) for the original RTA to less than that for a general RTA.   
Symmetrically, we can also postulate, because of the overlap with the original RTA, 
that the additional RTA performs less effectively so that the trade creation (between B 
and C) for the new RTA is lower.     
We implement this idea similarly as before; namely we use another dummy 
variable representing a member of an RTA forming another RTA(s) with some other 
countries, i.e.,  / RTAs SingleOverlap, that is defined as follows:   
   / ijt RTAs SingleOverlap   is a binary variable which is unity if both i and j belong to 
                                                 
22 Instead of considering collective negotiations between the RTAs as a group, however, we confine our 
analyses to each member country’s incentive to act individually to bridge two separate RTAs.    This is 
justified by assuming that, for example, communication costs increase to forbiddingly higher levels as 
more countries participate in the negotiations. 
23 This case subsumes other cases where, for example, country A also forms a new RTA with another 
country D, exclusive of country B. 
  30the same RTA, and either i or j exclusively belongs to another RTA with other 
countries. 
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In this setting of the estimation, the new dummy,  / RTAs SingleOverlap, captures just 
the additional trade creation taking place between an overlapped country and a member 
country not overlapped together.  
The estimation results with both random and fixed effects for equation (5) are 
reported in column (1) in Table 7.    Again, the estimation results with random effects 
are similar to those with fixed effects.    If we focus on the estimation results with fixed 
effects, the estimated coefficient for  / RTAs Insiders  (0.616, s.e.=0.031) is 
significantly higher than that in Table 2, but the estimated coefficient for 
/ RTAs SingleOverlap  (-0.445, s.e.=0.045) is negative and  highly  significant.  This 
implies that if a member forms another RTA, by creating overlapping RTAs, its 
additional trade with members of existing RTA(s) or with members of new RTA(s) is 
less than the additional trade formed between members belonging to a single RTA.   
According to the estimates, an overlapped country experiences an 18.6 % increase in 
trade with non-overlapped member countries compared to a random match, which is 
much less than the 85.2% estimate for trade creation from a single RTA. 
Based on the above results, one might be tempted to conclude that the 
  31undesirable effects of overlapping RTAs are generated because some of the original 
members are excluded from the new RTA.    Now we investigate if the same undesirable 
effects occur if a group of member countries join a new RTA together.    For example, 
let’s consider countries A and B that form an RTA with country C and then establish 
another RTA with country D.    Is the trade creation between A and B lower than that for 
the members belonging to a single RTA? 
We test this hypothesis by including another new dummy for overlapping RTAs, 
/ RTAs GroupOverlap , that is defined as follows:   
 
   / ijt RTAs GroupOverlap   is a binary variable which is unity if both i and j belong to 
multiple RTAs as a group. 
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Our new dummy variable captures the additional trade creation taking place between 
country-pairs that belong to multiple RTAs at the same time.    There are quite a few 
countries (for example, Australia and New Zealand) that have formed overlapping RTAs 
(such as CER and SPARTCA).   
The results for equation (6) reported in column (2) in Table 7 strongly support 
the hypothesis that overlapping RTAs may not be as effective as a single RTA.    In the 
fixed effects estimation, the estimated coefficient of the overlapping RTA dummy (-
  320..465, s.e.=0.024) is negative and highly significant.  By  adding the coefficient 
RTAs/Insiders (0.444, s.e.=0.024), this still amounts to a negative trade creation.    This 
estimate is much lower than the 71.3% estimate of the trade creation of a single 
RTA.
２４    This evidence clearly suggests that overlapping RTAs are not desirable for 
increasing global trade.   
One possible way for RTAs to expand their membership is for more and more 
countries to voluntarily become members of overlapping RTAs.    This can lead to 
more overlaps of membership across RTAs, and may eventually force the RTAs to 
merge completely.    However our results clearly indicate that this may not happen.   
Consider the incentive for a member who creates or joins another RTA.    By 
becoming a member of overlapping RTAs, the country is creating trade from new 
members but at the same time it experiences trade loss (or no trade gain) from old 
members.    As long as the trade creation from new members dominates the trade loss 
from old members, it could keep creating or joining new RTAs.    However, as the 
RTA becomes larger, since trade loss is continuously increasing, more and more new 
RTAs are needed for trade creation to dominate trade loss.    Multiple countries acting 
together and increasing the number of overlapped members do not help because, as 
shown in the second case, the trade creation among a group of countries overlapped by 
multiple RTAs is close to zero, thereby increasing the severity of the trade loss.    In 
this sense, we anticipate that as the RTAs become larger, it is less likely that they will 
merge by the incentive of individual countries.    Hence proliferation of RTAs is less 
likely to eventually lead to a globally free market.   
                                                 
24 The random effects estimation generates a positive estimate of trade creation for overlapped RTAs, but 
it is still much smaller than the trade creation made by a single RTA. 
 
  33One might suspect that trade loss from overlapping RTAs is also due to the 
different characteristics of countries overlapped by multiple RTAs.    In column (3) in 
Table 5, we compare the mean values of the characteristics of the member countries by 
the groups of single overlapped, group overlapped, and non-overlapped countries.   
Based on both estimates in columns (4) and (5) in Table 3, we find that these different 
characteristics essentially contribute nothing to the trade loss from overlapped 
countries.     
The above results for overlapping RTAs can be interpreted in association with 
the so called "spaghetti bowl phenomenon."    According to this logic, the existence of 
overlapping RTAs could lead to the problem of discriminatory trade blocs so that the 
full effect of trade creation does not occur if some members are overlapping with other 
RTAs.    Previous literature has asserted that the use of restrictive rules of origin is the 
most important cause of restraining trade creation.    In this regard, our findings seem to 
be consistent with the evidence based on the EU (Augier et al., 2004) or NAFTA (Cadot 
et al., 2002) that restrictive and complex rules of origin constrain trade between 
members of multiple and overlapping RTAs. 
 
IV. Concluding  Remarks   
 
This paper has empirically investigated the effects of proliferating regional 
trading blocs on global trade.    We used a standard gravity model based on a large panel 
data set of 175 countries from 1948 to 1999.    We found that RTAs on average increase 
global trade by raising intra-bloc trade without damaging extra-bloc  trade.  The  net 
trade effect, however, differs substantially according to the types of RTA evolution over 
  34time, which we grouped as expansionary RTAs, duplicate RTAs or overlapping RTAs. 
Countries excluded from an RTA can seek membership of existing RTAs or 
may be impelled to negotiate new RTAs among nonmembers in order to counteract the 
intimidation of exclusion.    We found that the net trade-creating gains for new members 
joining an existing trading bloc are much less than the gains for original members.    On 
the other hand, nonmembers forming a new trading bloc with other nonmembers seem 
to enjoy the gains of original members without much diversion of trade from the 
members of existing RTAs.    Hence, the trade gain is larger for duplicate RTAs than for 
expansionary  RTAs.  This  explains  why  RTAs are currently proliferating.     
  We also found that the net trade creation effects of RTAs are substantially lower 
for countries participating in overlapping RTAs. The possibility of a “spaghetti bowl 
phenomenon” in overlapping RTAs suggests that the current proliferation of RTAs may 
not lead the world economy to global free trade.   
The net trade-creating effects heavily depend on the various strategic evolutions 
of RTAs.    Thus policy makers in RTA participating countries and multilateral 
institutions must carefully examine the evolutionary process of RTAs.    In particular, 
proliferating RTAs, particularly overlapping RTAs rather than expansionary ones, will 
eventually hinder trade among the overlapped membership countries, as well as global 
trade.   
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  39Table 1: Summary Statistics (1948-1999) 
 










Mean Std.  Dev 
Year  1981.0 12.472 1990.1  8.213  1986.8  9.907 
Log of trade  10.062 3.336 12.551 3.293  10.073  3.560 
Log of distance  8.165 0.809 6.764 0.804  8.254  0.733 
Log of GDP in 
pairs 
47.881 2.676 47.876 4.116  48.136  2.689 
Log of per capita 
GDP in pairs 
16.034 1.503 17.261 1.603  16.522  1.363 
Log of area in pairs 24.206   3.280  22.115   3.843  23.627    3.273 
Common land 
border dummy 
0.031    0.172  0.113    0.317  0.012     0.110 
Common language 
dummy 
0.223    0.416  0.329    0.470  0.189     0.391 
Ex-common 
colonizer dummy 
0.100    0.300  0.204    0.403  0.070     0.256 
Ex-colony-
colonizer dummy 
0.021    0.142  0.031    0.173  0.026     0.159 
Current colony 
dummy 
0.002    0.044  0     0  0.001     0.036 
Currency union    0.014 0.118 0.039 0.193  0.001  0.034 
 
Notes: See the text for an explanation of variables. 
  40Table 2: Effects of RTAs on Trade Flows 
 




Distance  -1.219** 
(0.025) 
-- 








Area in pair  -0.078** 
(0.008) 
-- 
Common land border  0.675** 
(0.132) 
-- 
Common language    0.382** 
(0.052) 
-- 
Ex-common colonizer    0.111 
(0.065) 
-- 
Ex-colony-colonizer   2.310** 
(0.171) 
-- 
















R-squared 0.60  0.51 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of real bilateral trade.    All the explanatory variables except the 
dummy variables are taken logarithms.    RTAs/Insiders indicates a binary variable which is unity if i and 
j belong to the same RTA. RTAs/Outsiders indicates a binary variable which is unity if i belongs to an 
RTA and j does not belong to the same RTA or vice versa. The panel data estimation techniques were 
applied to 234,597 country pairs in total over the period from 1948 to 1999. The summary statistics for all 
variables are shown in Table 1.    Robust standard errors of the estimated coefficients are reported in 
parentheses.    Intercept and year dummy variables are included (not reported). ** and * indicate that the 
estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 1 % and 5 %, respectively. 
  41Table 3: Country Characteristics and the Effects of RTAs on Trade 






























































RTAs/InBorder   0.662** 
(0.070) 
















RTAs/InArea         0.028* 
(0.013) 
RTAs/InGDP         0.061** 
(0.013) 
RTAs/InGDPPC         -0.102** 
(0.018) 
































RTAs/OutArea        -0.058**
(0.004) 
RTAs/OutGDP        0.158** 
(0.005) 
RTAs/OutGDPPC        -0.094** 
(0.007) 
RTAs/OutCC         -0.518** 
(0.033) 
R-squared  0.51  0.52  0.51 0.52 0.53 
  42Notes to Table 3: All the estimations are based on panel regressions with fixed effects. RTAs/InBorder 
(RTAs/OutBorder) is an interaction term between RTA/Insiders (RTA/Outsiders) and a common land 
border dummy. Other variables with RTAs/In-- or RTAs/Out-- are similarly defined.   For the others, see 
also the notes in Table 2. 
 
















Area in pair  -0.070** 
(0.008) 
-- 
Common land border  0.636** 
(0.131) 
-- 
Common language    0.377** 
(0.051) 
-- 
Ex-common colonizer    0.075 
(0.065) 
-- 
Ex-colony-colonizer   2.322** 
(0.171) 
-- 


























R-squared 0.60  0.50 
Notes:  / RTAs Original   is a dummy variable which is unity if both countries are the original 
members of an RTA that expands its membership.  / RTAs Expansion   is a binary variable which is 
unity if one country newly joins the existing RTA that includes the other as an original member. For the 
others, see also the notes in Table 2. 
 
  44Table 5:    Mean Values for Subgroups 
 
  (1) Expansionary 
RTAs 
(2) Duplicate RTAs  (3)Overlapping RTAs 










Number of Obs.  1,321 5,565 28,583  87,583  3,393  585 4,997 
Year  1988.6 1991.2 1992.3 1985.0  1993.2  1995.0  1988.2 
Trade  11.532 12.986  9.975  10.105  12.605  12.639  12.499 
Distance  6.281 6.905 8.426 8.198  6.983  6.668  6.615 
GDP in pairs  44.516 49.138 48.217 48.110  48.734  48.303  47.294 
p/c GDP in pairs  16.787 17.786 16.911 16.395  17.449  17.073 17.118 
Area in pairs  18.561 22.661 23.145 23.785  23.356  23.693  21.253 
Common land border    0.164 0.059 0.009 0.253  0.080  0.138  0.136 
Common language    0.713 0.157 0.175 0.013  0.086  0.029  0.499 
Ex-common colonizer  0.691 0.073 0.054 0.075  0.054  0.118 0.308 
Ex-colony-colonizer  0.011 0.038 0.027 0.025  0.017  0.046  0.040 
Current colony    0 0  0.001  0.001  0  0  0 
Currency union    0.130 0.019 0.001 0.001  0.009  0  0.060 
 
Notes: All the variables are taken logarithms except year and dummy variables. See the text for an 
explanation of the variables.   
 

















Area in pair  -0.078** 
(0.008) 
-- 
Common land border  0.662** 
(0.132) 
-- 
Common language    0.393** 
(0.052) 
-- 
Ex-common colonizer    0.119** 
(0.065) 
-- 
Ex-colony-colonizer   2.289** 
(0.171) 
-- 




















R-squared 0.60  0.51 
 
Notes:    is a binary variable which is unity if both countries belong to different RTAs. 
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Table 7: Trade Effects of Overlapping RTAs 
 
  (1) Single Country Overlapping (2) Group of Countries 
Overlapping 
























































































R-squared  0.60 0.51 0.62  0.51 
Notes: RTAs/SingleOverlap is a dummy variable which is unity if both countries belong to the same RTA 
and at the same time one of the two countries belongs to another RTA. RTAs/GroupOverlap is a binary 
variable which is unity if both i and j belong to two or more different RTAs.    For the others, see also the 
notes in Table 2.   